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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 8937

JAMES L. HATCH and
DELLA L. HATCH,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, the State of Utah, commenced this suit
in the District Court of Garfield County, State of Utah,
to quiet title to mineral deposits in certain school lands,
located within Section 2, Township 37 South, Range 7
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Garfield County, State of
Utah. Plaintiff's complaint seeks· to quiet title to the
mineral rights in said land, and asserts no claim whatsoever to the surface rights.
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Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim to
said Complaint, which Answer denies generally the allegations of the Complaint and affirmatively alleges that
the mineral deposits in the said lands are owned by the
defendants. Defendants' Counterclaim seeks to quiet title
to the said minerals in the defendants. Plaintiff filed a
reply to defendants' Counterclaim generally denying the
allegations thereof.
On June 4, 1958, the said action came on regularly
for trial before the Honorable John L. Sevy, Jr., District
Judge at the Courthouse in Richfield, Sevier County,
Utah. It was stipulated by counsel that the matter could
be tried and heard at Richfield. A written stipulation of
facts, set forth at Page 11 of the transcript was entered
into, executed by the counsel for the parties and filed
at the commencement of the trial. Said stipulation establishes all of the factual questions relating to the said
action with the exception of the question of whether the
purported exchange by the State of Utah with the United
States of America was made for the purpose of compacting the holdings of the State of Utah pursuant to the
provisions of Section 65-1-70, Utah Code Annotated,
1953. Evidence was introduced with respect to the latter
question by plaintiff through the testimony of Mr. Donald E. Prince, employee of the Utah State Land Board,
which testimony is set forth commencing at page 29 of
the transcript.
On July 14, 1958, the District Court rendered a
memorandum de.cision, set forth commencing at page
14 of the transcript, holding in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiff. In said memorandum, the
District Court candidly stated that, ccWith the limited

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
time and somewhat limited authorities at my command,
I have tried to the best of my ability to grasp the significance and meaning of the various points raised and to
arrive at the proper decision."
On July 22, 1958, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and a Judgment and Decree were entered in
favor of defendants and against plaintiff on the Complaint and Counterclaim. Plaintiff commenced this appeal by Notice of Appeal filed on the 8th day of July,
1958.
STATEMENT O·F FACTS
There is no dispute with respect to the facts. The
complaint filed by the State of Utah asks for judgment
quieting its title to the mineral deposits in certain lands
located within Section 2, Township 37 South, Range 7
West, Salt Lake Meridian. Title to both the surface rights
and the mineral deposits of said lands is claimed by the
defendants, James L. Hatch and his wife, Della L. Hatch.
The lands involved, including the mineral deposits
therein, were granted to the State of Utah for the support of its common schools by Section 6 of the Utah
Enabling Act. Title thereto vested in the State of Utah,
upon approval of survey, which took place prior to May
24, 1897. Thereafter, on or about November 23, 1903,
the United States purported to withdraw the described
real property for a proposed forest reserve, which reserve is now known as the Dixie National Forest. The
inclusion of the described property within the boundaries·
of the forest reserve had no effect, however, upon the
fee title of the State of Utah.
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In September and October, 1925, the State Land
Board of Utah made certain indemnity school land selections using the subject lands as base for an exchange
of other lands located within the State. The selected
lieu lands as well as the base lands exchanged are set forth
in Selection Lists Nos. 2225 and 2226 (Exhibit uA" and
Exhibit (CB"). Thereafter, on September 5, 1928, the
selections and exchange were approved by the United States
by what is known as Approved List No. 156 (Exhibit
ccc") . The said selection and exchange purportedly were
made pursuant to the provisions of Sections 2275 and 227 6,
United States Revised Statutes, as amended, and made
applicable to the State of Utah by the Act of Congress
of May 3, 1902, which statutes are designated as Sections
851, 852, and 853, Title 43, United States Code.
At the time the purported selections and exchange
were made, there was in full force and effect a State
statute enacted on March 13, 1919, effective May 12,
1919-, and presently known and designated as Section 651-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The statute provides
as follows:
((65-1-15. Coal and mineral deposits reservedExceptions-Sales on royalty basis.-All coal and

other mineral deposited in lands belonging to the
state of Utah are hereby reserved to the state.
Such deposits are reserved from sale, except on a
rental and royalty basis as herein provided, and
the purchaser of any lands belonging to the state
shall acquire no right, title or interest in or to
such deposits, but the rights of such purchaser
shall be subject to the reservation of all coal and
other mineral deposits, and to the conditions and
limitations prescribed by law providing for the
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state and persons authorized by it to prospect or
mine, and to remove such deposits, and to occupy
and use so much of the surface of said lands as
may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining and removal of such deposits
therefrom; provided that improved farm lands
acquired by the state through foreclosure proceedings or improved farm lands conveyed to the state
by deed in satisfaction of farm loan mortgages
may be sold by the state without mineral reservations. Salts and other minerals in the waters of
navigable lakes and streams are likewise reserved
to the state and shall be sold by the state land board
only upon royalty basis. The amount of such
royalties and the terms of such contracts shall be
determined by the board; provided, that all such
contracts shall be subject to the use of the waters
for public purposes, and provided further that
before executing a contract which contemplates
the recovery of salts and minerals from said waters,
the state land board shall require evidence that an
application for the appropriation of water for such
purpose has been filed with the state engineer and
is pending in his office."
The State of Utah claims that by virtue of the
above quoted mineral reservation, it did not surrender
the mineral deposits in the lands here involved at the time
of the purported exchange with the United States.
The claim of the defendants to the mineral deposits
in the land arises as follows: It is claimed that the State
of Utah surrendered its title to the United States in both
the surface rights and the mineral deposits at the time of
the purported exchange in the year 1925. Thereafter, the
United States conveyed titled to the aforesaid property
to the defendants' predecessor, Ira W. Hatch, by patent
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dated January 3, 1937. This latter conveyance was the
result of an exchange of lands between Ira W. Hatch
and the United States under the Act of March 20, 1922,
16 U.S.C. §485. Neither the patent from the United
States to Ira W. Hatch nor the conveyance from Ira W.
Hatch to the defendant, James L. Hatch, contained any
reservation of mineral interest.
There are no written instruments relating to the
purported exchange of lands between the State of Utah
and the United States other than the referred to Selection
Lists of 1925 and the Approved List of 1928. The Lists
are silent with respect to any mineral reservation or
mineral conveyance.
According to the uncontradicted testimony of Donald G. Prince, Land Examiner of the Utah State Land
Board, none of the selections included in the Selection
Lists of 1925 had any tendency to compact the State's
land holdings. None of the selected lieu lands were located
either contiguous to or in the vicinity of other State
owned lands.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD BY
THE STATE OF UTAH IN TRUST IN ITS GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY.
POINT II.
THE UTAH STATUTES REQUIRE A RESERVATIO·N OF MINERALS.
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POINT III.
UTAH LAW NECESSARILY CONTROLS THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER THE STATE RELINQUISHED THE MINERALS IN ITS SCHOOL
LANDS.
POINT! IV.
THE EXCHANGE WAS ONE OF EQUIVALENTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD BY
THE STATE OF UTAH IN TRUST, IN ITS GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY.

It is an admitted fact that the lands here involved,
including the mineral deposits therein, were granted to
the State of Utah for the support of its common schools
under the Utah Enabling Act, and that title thereto
vested in the State of Utah, upon approval of survey,
which took place prior to May 24, 1897. An examination
of the Enabling Act and the State Constitution make it
clear that the school section grants are held by the State
in its sovereign or governmental capacity, as distinguished
from a proprietary capacity.
Section 6 of the Enabling Act (28 Stat. 107) contains the following language:
((That upon the admission of said state into
the Union, sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-
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two and thirty-six in every township . . . are
hereby granted to said state for the support of
common schools."
Section 10, of the Enabling Act, reads in part:
((That the proceeds of lands herein granted
for educational purposes, except as hereinafter
otherwise provided, shall constitute a permanent
school fund, the interest of which only shall be
expended for the support of said schools."
Pertinent provisions of the State Constitution include Article XX, Section 1, as follows:
((All lands of the state that have been, or may
hereafter be granted to the state by Congress, and
all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise, from
any person or corporation, or that may otherwise
be acquired, are hereby accepted and declared to
be the public lands of the state; and shall be held
in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may
be provided by law, for the respective purposes
for which they have been or may be granted,
dona ted, devised or otherwise acquired."
Article 10, Se.ction 3, of the State Constitution, provides
that the proceeds of the sale of State lands and other lands
granted for the support of common schools shall be and
remain a perpetual fund, the interest only to be used.
Section 5 of the same Article is substantially to the same
effect, while Section 7 provides that all public school
funds shall be guaranteed by the state against loss or
diversion.
The foregoing portions of the Enabling Act and of
the State Constitution reveal an intent to impose upon
the State a special trust and responsibility with respect
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to school section grants. In the words of this Court, ((It
must be conceded that these lands are held by the state
in its governmental capacity and not otherwise." VanWagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418, 442, 199 Pac. 670,
679, and see Duchesne County, et al., v. State Tax Commission, et al., 104 Utah 365, 372-383, 140 P. 2d 335,
338-343.

As stated in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, supra, upon
rehearing:
((The Constitution declares that such lands
cshall be held in trust for the people to be disposed of as may be provided by law for the respective purposes for which they have been, or may
be granted.' We emphasized [in the Court's initial opinion] the language just quoted, and stated
that it was an (absolute limitation upon the power
of the state to dispose of such lands, or permit
them to be disposed of, except for the purposes
for which they were granted by Congress.' We
reaffirm what was there stated, for we find no
reason to change our opinion. If there ever was
a solemn declaration of trust made by a grantee
of lands and published as such to all the world,
it seems to us that this declaration is a perfect
example. In view of the pledges, guaranties, assurances, and declarations of the Constitution, it
must be conceded that these lands are held by the
state in its governmental capacity and not otherwise. When such is the case, ordinary statutes of
limitations do not apply. To bring such lands
within the operation of limitative statutes, it is
extremely doubtful if anything short of an amendment to the Constitution could effect the result .
. . ." 58 Utah 442, 199 Pac. 679.
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Since the State of Utah hold such lands in trust in
its governmental .capacity, it necessarily follows that the
State would not be bound by any unauthorized acts of
its officers or agents in connection with the disposition of
the lands. State v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District, 51 N.M. 297, 183 P. 2d 607; Newton v. State Board
of Land Commissioners, et al., 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053.
In the same connection, federal courts have held that
federal land officers are without power to effect sales and
conveyances not specifically authorized by federal land
laws. Price v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 267 U. S. 415, 45
S. Ct. 312; St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104
U.S. 636; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U.S. 618; 8 S. Ct. 1228.
Under the holding of the Van Wagoner case, the
State would not be subject to such defenses as the statute
of limitations, adverse possession, estoppel or waiver, absent specific State legislation to that effect. See also Pioneer
Investment & Trust Company v. Board of Education, 35
Utah 1, 99 Pac. 150; and State v. George C. Stafford &
Sons, 99 N.H. 92, 105 A. 2d 569, 573.
POINT II.
THE UTAH STATUTES REQUIRE A RESERVATION OF MINERALS.
Since the constitution of the State of Utah provides
that State lands can be disposed of only nas may be provided by law" (Article XX, Section 1), it becomes appropriate to inquire what authority, if any, the State
Land Board had to dispose of school section lands by an
exchange arrangement with the United States. Such authority necessarily must be found in applicable State
statutes.
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What then is the statutory power conferred upon
the State Land Board to dispose of state school sections
by an exchange with the United States? The defendants
have suggested that such power is: conferred by what are
now Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. But as will be herein demonstrated,
these two sections are inapplicable.
Sction 65-1-27 was first enacted in 1896. In 1925,
at the time of the selections and exchange here involved,
the statute read as· follows:
((Sec. 55 8 0. Selections in legal subdivisionssecure approval of U. S. Officers-cancellations,
etc. All selections of land shall be made in legal
subdivisions according to the United States survey,
and when the selection has been made and approved
by the land board, they shall take such action as
shall be necessary to secure the approval of the
proper officers of the United States, and the final
transfer to this State of the lands selected. The
land board is hereby empowered to cancel, relinquish, or release the claims of the State to, and to
re-convey to the United States, any particular
tract of land erroneously listed to the State, or any
tract upon which, at the time of selection, a bona
:fide .claim has been initiated by an actual settler."
(Session Laws of Utah, 1925, Chapter 31, Section
5580).
The quoted provision has remained in substantially the
same form up to the present time. The first sentence
thereof appears to be merely directory. It directs the
Land Board to take necessary action to secure the a pproval of the United States and the transfer to the State
of lands to be selected. The Enabling Act, in addition to
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granting the State four school sections in every township (Sec. 6), also granted the State many other lands
in quantity or by way of indemnity (Sections 7, 8, 12).
Many of these grants did not take effect nor did title
vest until selections, according to United States surveys,
were made by the State. The first sentence of Section
65-1-27 is obviously a directory provision aimed at hastening this selection process. It does not refer in any sense
to school section lands, title to which already had vested
in the State.
The second sentence of Section 5580 (now 65-1-27)
is the empowering provision. It authorizes the Land
Board to relinquish and reconvey to the United States
tracts of land erroneously listed to the State or tracts
upon a claim which has been initiated by a settler at the
time of selection. The power of reconveyance is expressly
limited to two situations, tracts erroneously listed and
tracts where a settler has initiated a claim. No power
to reconvey any other type of land is conferred. Certainly, no power to reconvey or exchange school sections
in which title had vested in the State is conferred.
The other state statute which the defendants suggest
as conferring power upon the State Land Board is Section 65-1-70, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That statute
was first enacted in 1897. In 1925, at the time of the
selections and exchange here involved, it read as follows:
Sec. 5618. To compact State land holdingsexchanges, etc. In order to compact, as far as
practicable, the land holdings of the State, the
land board is hereby authorized to exchange any
of the land held by the State for other land within
the State held by other proprietors; and upon request of the land board the governor is hereby
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authorized to execute and deliver the necessary
patents to such other proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of the lands so exchanged; provided, that no exchange shall be made by the land
board until a patent for the land so received in
exchange shall have been issued by the government
of the United States to such proprietors or their
grantors." (Session Laws of Utah, 1925, Chap. 31,
sec. 5618)
Except for minor amendments, this statute remained unchanged until the 1933 Revised Statutes. At that time,
the statute was amended to read:
((86-1-58. Exchange of lands Between Board
and Proprietors. In order to compact, as far as
practicable, the land holdings of the state, the
board is hereby authorized to exchange any of the
land held by the state for other land of equal value
within the state held by other proprietors; and
upon request of the board the governor is hereby
authorized to execute and deliver the necessary
patents to such other proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of the lands so exchanged; provided, that no exchange shall be made by the
land board until a patent for the land so received
in exchange shall have been issued to such proprietors or their grantors." (Revised Statutes, 1933,
Section 86-1-58)
The changes made in the 1933 Revised Statutes
are indicated by italicizing above. As apparent, · the
phrase ccof equal value" was inserted in the statute, and
the phrase ccby the government of the United States"
was deleted preceding the phrase ccto such proprietors or
their grantors."
Although Section 5618 (now 65-1-70) authorizes
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certain exchanges of lands held by the State, it expressly
limits such exchanges to situations where the United
States has issued a patent on the lands to be received by
the State in the exchange. The statute would seem, therefore, to refer to a private exchange between the State
and a proprietor who has received a patent from the
United States. In the context of the statute, the term
uproprietor" obviously refers to some one other than the
United States. Moreover, according to the statute itself,
the purpose of the authorization to the State Land Board
is {{in order to compact, as far as practicable, the land
holdings of the state." It will be recalled that the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiffs' witness, Gale
Prince, indicated that the exchange here involved had no
tendency in any way to compact the State's holdings.
Throughout, the statute speaks in terms of an exchange
of deeds and patents on the part of both the State and
of the proprietor with whom the exchange is to be
effected. In the present case, as in all cases of selections
and exchanges between the State and the United States,
no deeds or patents are exchanged on either side. The
en tire transaction consists of the selection lists and the
approved list. It is submitted, therefore, that Section 5618
(now Section 65-1-70) furnishes no authority to the State
Land Board to dispose of State school section lands.
The authority of the State Land Board - if authority
exists - to enter into exchanges ·with the United States
must stem from what is now known as Section 65-1-14,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The statute was first enacted in 1896, in substantially its present form. In 1925,
its pertinent provision read as follows:
uSee. 5575. Control of State lands-lease-sell,
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etc.-reserve. The State Land Board shall have the
direction, management and control of all lands
heretofore or which may hereafter be granted to
this State by the United States, or otherwise ... for
any and all purposes whatsoever, ... and shall have
the power to sell or lease the same for the best
interests of the State and in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter and the constitution of
this State .... " (1925 Session Laws of Utah, Chap.
31, Sec. 5575)
This provision, with additions not here material,
exists today in substantially the same form. The somewhat broad powers conferred upon the State Land Board
authority to direct, manage and control the lands granted
to the State by the United States. As used in this statute
((the power to sell" must be taken to include an exchange
between the State and the federal government. Even
though the decisions are not uniform, in similar situations
courts frequently have held the term ((sell" or ((sale" to
include an ((exchange." Newton v. State Board of Land
Commissioners, et al., a37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053; Bridgforth v. Middleton, et al., 184 Miss. 632, 186 So. 837. And
in Wyoming v. United States (1921), 255 U.S. 489, 497,
41 S. Ct. 393, the Supreme Court referred to a similar
selection and exchange between a state and the United
States as the equivalent of a cash transaction. The Court
said:
((. . . Of course the State's right under the
selection was precisely the same as if in 1912 it had
made a cash entry of the selected land under an
applicable statute, for the waiver of its right to
the tract in the forest reserve was the equivalent
of a cash consideration. And yet it hardly would
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be suggested that the Commissioner or the secretary on coming to consider the cash entry could
do .otherwise than approve it, if at the time it was
made the land was open to such an entry and the
amount paid was the la·wful price."
In this connection, it must be noted that the power
of the State Land Board to nsell" under the authority
of Section 5575 (now 65-1-14) is expressly limited by
the requirement that it must be ((in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter and the constitution of this
state." (1925 Session Laws, Chap. 31, Sec. 5575.) The
very next section of this Chapter of the 1925 Session
Laws, Section 5 575x, states:

rrcoal and mineral lands reserved. All coal and
other mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
State are hereby reserved to the state. Such deposits are reserved from sale except upon a rental
and royalty basis as herein provided and the purchaser of any land belonging to the state shall
acquire no right, title or interest in, or to such
deposits, and the right of such purchaser shall be
subject to the reservation. . . . "
The foregoing provision has remained substantially the
same since its first enactment on March 13, 1919. It is
now known as Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated,
1953. The statute constitutes an absolute and unconditional reservation in the State of all mineral deposits
and an express prohibition against any attempt to alienate such mineral deposits, except upon a rental or royalty
basis.
Clearly, Sections 5575 and 5575x (Sections 65-1-14
and 65-1-15 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953) are in pari
materia. They must be read and construed together. Just
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as the term nsell" in Section 5575 must necessarily include
an ((exchange," so also, the prohibition reserving minerals
from ((sale" in Section 5575x must likewise apply to an
((exchange." No other construction would be reasonable
or in accord with the clear intent of the two sections.
As hereinabove stated, a selection and exchange of
surface lands with the United States must be effected
by the State Land Board under the powers conferred
by Section 5575, rather than Sections 5580 or 5618. But
even if the plaintiff should be mistaken as to this, the
fact still remains that any disposition of school section
lands under Sections 55 80 or 5 618 of the same Chapter 3 1
would be subject to the express mineral reservation of
Section 5575x, to the same extent as Section 5575 is
subject to that reservation.
POINT III.
UTAH LAW NECESSARILY CONTROLS THE
QUESTIO·N O·F WHETHER THE STATE RELINQUISHED THE MINERALS IN ITS SCHOOL
LANDS.
Defendants concede that the fee simple title to the
subject lands vested completely in the State of Utah
prior to May 24, 1897. Although conceding this important fact, defendants apparently argue that the federal law controls the transaction. The question which
defendants do not answer, however, is how the .jurisdiction
of the federal government re-attached to the subject
lands when clearly such jurisdiction ceased and terminated
prior to May 24, 1897. The decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States hold with clarity that when
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title to school lands once vests in a state the jurisdiction
of the United States ceases with respect thereto. In
Cooper v. Roberts, 18 Howard 173, and Alabama v.
Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 34 S. Ct. 301, the Supreme Court
held that the state had full authority to subject vested
school lands to the ordinary incidents of other titles in
the state.
An excellent discussion of this question is contained
in the decision in United States vs. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 24
L. Ed. 192, in which the Court stated:
uThe power of the State to regulate the tenure
of real property within her limits, and the modes
of its acquisition and transfer, and the rules of
its descent, and the extent to which a testamentary
disposition of it may be exercised by its owners,
is undoubted. It is an established principle of law,
everywhere recognized, arising from the necessity
of the case, that the disposition of immovable
property, whether by deed, descent, or any other
mode, is exclusively subject to the government
within whose jurisdiction the property is situated.
McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 202, 6
L. Ed. 300. The power of the State in this respect
follows from her sovereignty within her limits,
as to all matters over which jurisdiction has not
been expressly or by necessary implication transferred to the Federal government. The title and
modes of disposition of real property within the
State, whether into vivos or testamentary, are not
matters placed under the control of Federal authority. Such control would be foreign to the
purposes for which the Federal government was
created, and would seriously embarrass the landed
interests of the State."
In State of California vs. Deseret W atcr, Oil mul
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Irrigation Company, 243 U. S. 415, the Supreme Court
of the United States, although holding that a state might
waive its rights in school lands in an exchange with
United States, expressly stated:
((With the state questions we have no concern,
their ultimate solution being a matter for that
court."
In other words the Supreme Court held that the
question of whether the state had by proper authority
effected a waiver of its mineral rights in school lands
was a question of state, not federal law.
The identical problem was presented to the Supreme
Court of Idaho in N ew'ton vs. State Board of Land Commissioners, et al., 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053. That case
involved the issue of whether the State Board of Land
Commissioners had authority to exchange state owned
school sections with the United States in the face of a
requirement of the Idaho Admissions Bill that school
section lands should be ((disposed of only at public sale"
and a state constitutional provision prohibiting the sale of
school sections ufor less than ten dollars per acre." The
contention was made that the State Board's authority to
enter into an exchange was derived from Sections 851 and
852, Title 43, United States Code. In disposing of this
argument, the Idaho Supreme Court carefully reviewed
and analyzed the Deseret Water, Oil & Irrigation Co. case,
both the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
and the opinion of the California State Supreme Court
(167 Cal. 147, 138 Pac. 981). The Idaho Supreme Court
concluded that the federal statute was no more than
permissive and did not touch upon the question of state
law or authority. As stated in its opinion:
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((Clearly the foregoing opinion [of the United
States Supreme] does not go further than to
hold that sections 2275 and 2276, Rev. Stats. U.S.,
confer upon a state the right to receive indemnity
lands for school sections 16 and 3 6 to which it has
a complete and indefeasible title, upon its surrender
of such lands to the government, and that its
reinvestment of title in the government operates
to waive its rights as to such land and take title
to the indemnity lands. But as we understand
the decision, the Federal Supreme Court expressly
disavows any purpose to decide for the state when
and under what circumstances it has authority
under its Constitution and laws to surrender such
school lands, which is the question before us for
determination. . . ."

::- * *
uit is clear that the federal Supreme Court in
California v. Deseret Water, Oil & Irrigation Co.,
supra, in construing said sections 2275 and 2276
of the United States Revised Statutes, as these sections were amended in 1891, subsequent to the passage of the Idaho Admission Bill, held that Congress has authorized the government to consent to
such exchange, but it has not undertaken therein
or elsewhere to say that these provisions of the
statute go farther than to be permissive. As in
that opinion declared, the question as to whether
or not the state under its Constitution and laws
has authority to make such exchange is one for
the ultimate decision of the state's courts. This
court is bound by the plain provisions of the Constitutional provision, which clearly and lmmistakably prohibits such an exchange. We therefore
hold that the state board of land commissioners
is without authority to effect such proposed exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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change with the government of the United States,
and that any action that it has taken or may attempt to take to carry out this exchange is contrary to the Constitution and null and void."
Again in United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 Fed. 2d
1003, (CCA 5th 1951) it was held that the law of the
State of Louisiana controlled the question of whether a
Louisiana statute of prescription applied with respect to
a transaction whereby Louisiana lands were sold to the
United States of America for national forest purposes.
And in Los Angeles and Salt LakeR. Co. v. U. S., 140
Fed. 2d 43 5 (CCA 9th 1944) it was held that the law
of the State of California governed in determining whether a deed from the State of California to the United States
conveyed the mineral rights in state land.
Other cases in which federal courts have applied
state law in transactions involving the United States of
America are: U. S. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.,
318 U.S. 206, 63 S. Ct. 534; The Choctaw and Chicasaw
Nations v. Wilmer D. Ceay, et al., 235 Fed. 2d 31 (CCA
lOth 1956); U. S. v. Champlin Refining Co., et al., 156
Fed. 2d 769, affirmed 331 U. S. 788, 67 S. Ct. 1346.
POINT IV.
THE EXCHANGE WAS ONE OF EQUIVALENTS.
The defendants argue that an exchange between the
United States and the State of Utah, in which the State
conveyed only surface rights to the lands it offered, would
not be a valid exchange of ((equivalents" as contemplated
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by applicable federal laws. Wyoming v. United States
(1920), 255 U. S. 489, 502. According to defendants,
since the lieu lands selected and received by the State
from the United States contained no mineral reservation
and the base lands surrendered by the State were subject
to a mineral reservation, there was no quid pro quo.
The fallacy of this argument is that the State was
permitted under the federal statute to make lieu selections
only of non-mineral lands. Revised Statutes, Section 2276
(now 43 U.S.C. §852) provides that the selections by
the State shall be ((not mineral in character." cf. United
States v. Sweet, (1918) 245 U. S. 563. Moreover, as
demonstrated by the certificate of the Commissioner of
General Land Office of the Department of Interior attached to and made a part of the Approved List 156
(Exhibit ((C"), a specific finding as to the ttnon-mineral
character" of the selected land is made by the Department
of Interior when the Approved List is issued and certified.
In an exchange between the United States and the
State, the intention of the United States is to give the
State only non-mineral lands in exchange for the school
sections surrendered as base. A mineral reservation in
the State, of lands to be surrendered, merely tends to
make the exchange, in truth, an exchange of ((equivalents."
The mere fact that many years later the selected lands
may prove to be valuable for minerals, and the State
thereby acquires a windfall, does not change the nature
of the exchange when made. At the time of the exchange,
the State surrender lands, with a mineral reservation in
the State. The United States grants to the State, lands
non-mineral in character. In every sense of the word
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there is a quid pro quo exchange of equivalents on bo~h
sides. The transaction must be considered as of the date
of the said exchange.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment quieting its title to the mineral deposits in the lands described in the complaint.
It is an admitted fact that title to both the surface
rights and the mineral deposits in the subject lands fully
vested in the State of Utah prior to the time of the
purported exchange of these lands with the United States
in 1925. It also is an admitted fact that at that time
there was in full force and effect a Utah law under which
((all coal and other minerals deposited in lands belonging
to the State of Utah are hereby reserved to the State."
(Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) This
reservation is absolute and unqualified. It constitutes a
complete barrier to any attempt or purported action of
any agent or official of the State to dispose of minerals
in State owned lands, except on a rental and royalty basis,
as specified by the State law.
Since the school section lands are held by the State
in trust, in its governmental capacity, they can be disposed of only as expressly authorized by law. In its governmental capacity the State is not subject to the usual
defenses of waiver, estoppel or laches. The mineral deposits in all State owned school lands are intended for
the benefit of all the citizens of the State, and for the
express purpose of supporting the state schools. It must
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be presumed that the United States took these school
lands with full knowledge of this fact.
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully
urges that the judgment below be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER, JR.
ATTO·RNEY GENERAL
STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS McCARTHY, Special Assistant
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF UTAH
Counsel for Appellant
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